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TO FORGIVE AND FORGET: 
HOW RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY 
LEGISLATION IN AFGHANISTAN 
FORGIVES WAR CRIMINALS WHILE 
FORGETTING THEIR VICTIMS 
Sara L. Carlson* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, after more than two generations of civil war and 
armed conflict, the controversial National Reconciliation, General 
Amnesty and National Stability Law (“Reconciliation and Amnesty 
Law”) became effective in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.1 This 
law aims to aid in the reconciliation process of former and current 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, 2012, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. Gratitude is owed and duly given to my husband for his patience, 
support, and love and to the two little boys who blessed me with the title of 
“Mommy,” for they also sacrificed so that I could chase a dream. Lastly, this 
comment is dedicated to my friends, comrades, and fellow veterans and their fami-
lies whose undaunted courage and immeasurable sacrifices will forever hold a place 
in my heart and to whom “thank you” will never be enough. 
1 See National Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability 
Law, Official Gazette, 965 of 13 Qaus 1387, Dec. 2009 (Afg.), art. 3 [hereinafter 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law], http://dkiafghanistan.um.dk/da/~/media/ 
dkiafghanistan/Documents/Other/National%20Reconciliation%20and%20Amnes
ty%20Law.ashx. 
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armed fighters, in turn bringing an end to decades of war.2 
Specifically, the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law authorizes amnesty 
from prosecution to perpetrators of hostile actions committed 
against the government of Afghanistan prior to the interim 
administration taking effect in late 2001. It also provides a path to 
amnesty for those committing subsequent and future hostile acts 
against the Afghan government.3 In July of 2010, after nearly a 
decade of failed programs that sought to implement reintegration 
guidelines for reconciled fighters, the government of Afghanistan 
approved the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program 
(“APRP”).4 The APRP provides a functioning framework for 
reconciliation and reintegration of combatants. Its aim is to achieve a 
sustainable peace in Afghanistan.5 This framework calls for the 
implementation of a broad spectrum of policies to reconcile former 
anti-government fighters, and attempts to succeed where previous 
reconciliation and reintegration programs fell short.6 Despite the lofty 
aspirational goals of these legislative efforts, implementation has and 
will continue to fail a critical party: the victims. 
This comment will analyze the reconciliation framework as 
delineated by the APRP and the implementation of the 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law. Part I of this comment will provide 
a brief overview of transitional justice7 as a solution to human rights 
                                                 
2 See id. 
3 See id.  
4 See DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION, AFGHANI-
STAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 3, July 7, 2010 [hereinafter APRP]. 
5 See id.  
6 See TAZREENA SAJJAD, AFG. RESEARCH & EVALUATION UNIT, PEACE 
AT ALL COSTS: REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2010) 
[hereinafter PEACE AT ALL COSTS], http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/ 
EditionPdfs/1035E-Peace%20at%20all%20Costs%20IP%202010%20web.pdf 
(providing a detailed discussion of the APRP in its entirety). 
7 Transitional justice “refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial 
measures that have been implemented by countries in order to redress the legacies 
of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, 
truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional re-
forms.” What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. [herein-
after What is Transitional Justice?], http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last up-
dated 2012). 
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abuses and the applicable law in Afghanistan.8 While the best 
approach to transitional justice relies on a comprehensive process 
including individualized responses to the judicial and non-judicial 
factors that traditionally define transitional justice,9 this comment 
focuses only on the APRP’s approach to reconciliation and the 
existing legislation. Part II will provide the historical framework 
necessary to understand the current implications of the recently 
enacted Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.10 Part III will describe 
briefly Afghanistan’s previous efforts at reconciliation, and examine 
why those efforts failed.11 Part IV will explore the APRP as it is 
currently being implemented,12 and Part V will describe its interplay 
with the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.13 Part V also will examine 
how the current legislative framework falls short of its objectives.14 
This comment will expose several problems that may arise as a result 
of combining the APRP’s plan for reintegration and reconciliation 
with the existing reconciliation legislation. It will also propose 
recommendations for modifying the existing legislation. Recognizing 
that the armed conflict in Afghanistan continues, this comment will 
conclude by asserting that the failure to recognize victims’ rights, 
while awarding amnesty to past and present war criminals, will 
significantly harm the reconciliation process, and ultimately delay the 
country’s ability to achieve sustainable peace. 
                                                 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See Louis Bickford, Transitional Justice, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1045, 1045-47 (Dinah Shelton ed., 
2004); see also What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 7 (providing a brief overview of 
transitional justice by defining the term and describing its historical roots and fu-
ture relevance in international law). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 See infra Part V. 
14 See infra Part V. 
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I. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS A SOLUTION 
A. Innocent Victims 
His name is Shafiq and he is purportedly eleven years old, 
though he appears no more than nine.15 Most children his age spend 
their days attending school, playing soccer, or flying kites. Shafiq, 
however, spends his days preparing to enter the practice of bacha bazi, 
or “dancing boys.”16 Bacha bazi, an ancient practice recently 
resurrected, involves pre-pubescent boys dressed in women’s 
clothing performing dances for the entertainment of wealthy and 
powerful men.17 It is a symbol of power, prestige, and social status 
among warlords, drug lords, and past and present insurgent 
commanders in the war torn country of Afghanistan.18 Unfortunately 
for the young boys forced into this criminal enterprise, the silence of 
the music and the end of the dance often leads to unspeakable crimes 
as the boys frequently transition to the role of sex slave.19 Shafiq 
thought he would be learning a new trade as an apprentice under the 
watchful tutelage of his new master when his impoverished and 
destitute family sold him because they needed money.20 Shafiq had no 
way of knowing that his world would change forever in the most 
cruel and horrendous ways imaginable. 
Now consider the life of a young woman whose father 
promised her to a local Taliban fighter at the age of twelve.21 Her 
                                                 
15 See Frontline: The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (PBS television broadcast 
Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Dancing Boys], http://video.pbs.org/video/1474778660. 
16 See Zadzi, Boys in Afghanistan Sold Into Prostitution, Sexual Slavery, 
DIGITAL J., Nov. 20, 2007, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/246409. 
17 See Dancing Boys, supra note 15. 
18 See Zadzi, supra note 16. 
19 See id.; see also Youngbee Dale, Bacha Bazi: Pedophilia and Child Trafficking 
Justified by the Tradition in Afghanistan, EXAMINER, Feb. 23, 2010, 
http://www.examiner.com/article/bacha-bazi-pedophilia-and-child-trafficking-
justified-by-the-tradition-afghanistan. 
20 See Dancing Boys, supra note 15.  
21 See Aryn Baker, Afghan Women and the Return of the Taliban, TIME, Aug. 
9, 2010 [hereinafter Baker, Afghan Women], http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,2007407,00.html; see also Karen Grigsby Bates, Bibi Aisha, Disfigured 
Afghan Woman Featured on ‘Time’ Cover, Visits U.S., NPR NEWS BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 
12:57 AM) [hereinafter Bates, Bibi Aisha], http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
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personal courage and will to live now serve as inspiration to the 
world.22 Aisha married the Talib fighter when she was only fourteen 
and she soon fell victim to unspeakable domestic abuse at the hands 
of her husband and her in-laws.23 In 2009, at the age of eighteen, she 
found the courage to escape but was quickly caught and returned to 
her abusive husband.24 The local Taliban commander, serving as the 
local unofficial judge, decided the reprisal she would face for her 
actions would serve to deter similar acts by other young wives in the 
future.25 Taliban fighters, including her husband, delivered the 
punishment with reckless abandon as they pulled out a knife, held her 
down, and sliced off Aisha’s ears and nose.26 Passing out from the 
pain, Aisha awakened when she began to choke on the blood 
streaming down the back of her throat.27 She had been left to die by 
the brutal executors of Taliban justice in the mountains of 
Afghanistan.28 
In a world where innocence should be the tie that binds 
children across continents, these horrific accounts paint a very 
different picture of the harsh reality that many children in countries 
plagued by war and civil strife continue to face. The concept of 
transitional justice serves as a framework for addressing the past 
crimes and abuses of victims like Shafiq and the present crimes that 
                                                 
way/2010/10/13/130527903/bibi-aisha-disfigured-afghan-woman-featured-on-
time-cover-visits-u-s. 
22 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21. 
23 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.  
24 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21. 
25 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21. 
26 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21. 
27 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.  
28 While Aisha’s story has all of the hallmarks of a modern day night-
mare, her future is looking brighter. Shortly after she awoke on the mountainside, 
she managed to crawl to her grandfather’s home and she was covertly transported 
to a U.S. military medical facility. Aisha was stabilized and placed in a secret shelter 
in Kabul where she remained until October of 2010 when she was transported to a 
private medical facility in California. She has since begun the arduous reconstruc-
tive surgery process, at no cost to her, but the healing process is far from over. See 
Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21. 
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women like Aisha endure despite existing legislation designed to 
prevent such brutality.29 
B. Transitional Justice in Afghanistan 
Transitional justice combines traditional judicial processes, 
such as prosecuting those accused of human rights violations, with 
non-judicial efforts.30 These non-judicial efforts include: creating fora 
such as truth commissions to investigate past abuses,31 establishing a 
system for reparations to victims of past abuse or violence, 
memorializing the victims of violence, transforming government 
security institutions such as police and military to ensure future 
violations do not occur and to restore trust in the government, and 
reconciling divided factions of society.32 
In 2005, the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (“GIRoA”), in collaboration with the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission and the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, developed the Peace, 
Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan Action Plan (“Justice 
Action Plan”).33 This comprehensive plan incorporated five actions 
to promote peace, reconciliation, and justice in Afghanistan while 
creating a culture of respect for human rights and accountability for 
                                                 
29 See Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9, at 1045-47; see also What is 
Transitional Justice?, supra note 7.  
30 See Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9, at 1045-47. 
31 A truth commission, though varied in its administration, is a “victim-
centered commission of inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary 
purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal causes and conse-
quences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that 
occurred in the state during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict and (2) 
making recommendations for their redress and future prevention.” ERIC 
WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE 
IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 3-4 (2010). 
32 Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9 at 1045-47; What is Transitional 
Justice?, supra note 7.  
33 See PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN: ACTION 
PLAN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 
[hereinafter JUSTICE ACTION PLAN], http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/ 
Reports/Thematic%20reports/Action_Pln_Gov_Af.pdf. 
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human rights violations.34 Following the traditional model for 
transitional justice, these actions include: “(1) acknowledgement of 
the suffering of the Afghan People; (2) ensuring credible and 
accountable state institutions; (3) truth-seeking and documentation; 
(4) promotion of reconciliation and national unity; and (5) 
establishment of effective and reasonable accountability 
mechanisms.”35 
Unfortunately, the government has failed to exercise the 
Justice Action Plan’s comprehensive approach to addressing both 
perpetrators of human rights violations and, more importantly, their 
victims.36 Ironically, this is likely due to the passage of the 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, a law allegedly meant to 
supplement the Justice Action Plan’s reconciliation ‘key action,’ but 
which has instead stifled the reconciliation process.37 The legislators’ 
need for self-preservation trumped justice. They likely passed the 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law due to fears that some of them 
would face prosecution for previous human rights violations 
committed either by their own hands or by those under their 
control.38 Their legislation left yet another reminder of corruption in 
government by providing for the broad amnesty of criminals, 
including some members of the government, while essentially closing 
the door to victims seeking justice.39 Guidance from the 
Disarmament and Reintegration Commission addressing the 
implementation of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law focuses on 
the recently approved Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program 
and abandons the Justice Action Plan and its comprehensive 
transitional justice model.40 
                                                 
34 See id. 
35 Id. 
36 See MICHAEL SEMPLE, RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN 59 (2009). 
37 See Afghanistan: Justice Action Plan Heading for Oblivion, IRIN, Apr. 14, 
2010, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88807/AFGHANISTAN-Justice-action-
plan-heading-for-oblivion. 
38 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 59. 
39 See JUSTICE ACTION PLAN, supra note 33; Afghanistan: Justice Action Plan 
Heading for Oblivion, supra note 37. 
40 See SAJJAD, PEACE AT ALL COSTS, supra note 6. 
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C. Abandoning Transitional Justice: What Now? 
In March of 2007, the Afghan Parliament passed the 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.41 Despite the fact that President 
Karzai never signed the bill,42 in accordance with the Afghan 
Constitution, it became law after a fifteen day lapse.43 The legislative 
process in Afghanistan provides that a bill will take effect only after it 
is published in the Official Gazette, even though it has passed and 
has effectively become law. In the case of the Reconciliation and 
Amnesty Law, publication in the Official Gazette did not occur until 
December of 2009, more than two years after its passage.44 The 
furtive publication of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law was met 
with controversy from human rights advocates because of the broad, 
sweeping nature of the law’s amnesty provision for eligible 
perpetrators of past, present, and potential future crimes.45 
Specifically, Article 3 of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law states 
that: 
(1) All political factions and hostile parties who were 
involved in one way or another in hostilities before 
establishing of the Interim Administration shall be 
included in the reconciliation and general amnesty 
program for the purpose of reconciliation among 
different segments of society, strengthening of peace 
and stability and starting of new life in the 
contemporary political history of Afghanistan, and 
                                                 
41 See Sari Kouvo, After Two Years in Legal Limbo: A First Glance at the Ap-
proved ‘Amnesty Law’, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK, Feb. 22, 2010, http://aan-
afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=665. 
42 President Hamid Karzai is the president of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan. 
43 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004, art. 94, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/404d8a594.html; see also Jon Boone, Af-
ghanistan Quietly Brings Into Force Taliban Amnesty Law, GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/11/taliban-amnesty-law-enacted. 
44 See Jonathon Burch, U.N. Calls for Repeal of Afghan Amnesty Law, 
REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/25/idINIndia-
47212320100325. 
45 See Boone, Afghanistan Quietly Brings Into Force Taliban Amnesty Law, supra 
note 43; Burch, U.N. Calls for Repeal of Afghan Amnesty Law, supra note 44. 
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
398 
enjoy all their legal rights and shall not be legally and 
judicially prosecuted. 
(2) Those individuals and groups who are still in 
opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
and cease enmity after the enforcement of this 
resolution and join the process of national 
reconciliation, and respect the Constitution and other 
laws and abide them shall enjoy the benefits of this 
resolution. 
(3) The provisions set forth in clause (1) and (2) of 
this article shall not affect the claims of individuals 
against individuals based upon Haqullabd (rights of 
people) and criminal offences in respect of individual 
crimes.46 
The practical effect of this article is that the government of 
Afghanistan has permitted members of insurgent groups presently 
opposing the government, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani 
Network, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, to seek amnesty without 
question of past crimes, and perhaps even without concern for future 
acts.47 However, the reach of the law also extends to those members 
of opposition groups that fought prior to the events of September 
11, 2001.48 These opposition forces include the anti-government 
mujahedeen fighters who fought to expel the former Soviet Union 
during their invasion of Afghanistan beginning in December of 
1979,49 the opposing factions fighting for power in the civil war that 
followed,50 and, more recently, the rise of the Taliban.51 
                                                 
46 Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art. 3. 
47 See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE U.S. AND THE 
DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 240-47 (2009) [here-
inafter RASHID, DESCENT]. 
48 See Kouvo, After Two Years in Legal Limbo: A First Glance at the Approved 
‘Amnesty Law’, supra note 41. 
49 See STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM 
ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE WAR AGAINST THE TALIBAN 235-37 (rev. ed. 
2009) (2002).  
50 See id. at 277-83. 
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Representatives from Afghanistan’s government recently 
participated in a global conference to discuss what has become 
known as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Plan (APRP).52 
The APRP sets forth the policy and framework, as proposed by the 
National Directorate of Security, that the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan shall take as it moves toward achieving a unified and 
peaceful nation.53 The APRP sets out the peace and reintegration 
approach in two overarching categories: operational and 
strategic/political.54 The operational category focuses on the low-level 
fighters, or foot soldiers, while the strategic/political category focuses 
on the senior level leadership of the insurgency.55 The framework 
provided by the APRP for the reconciliation of anti-government 
fighters relies on existing legislation, specifically the highly debated 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law passed in 2008, and the Afghan 
Constitution.56 To fully understand how the APRP and existing laws 
will impact today’s reconciliation efforts, it is important to 
understand the recent history of Afghanistan that the Reconciliation 
and Amnesty Law encompasses. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THREE DECADES OF WAR AND 
BRUTALITY 
A. The End of the Monarchy, The Beginning of Communism 
Modern Afghanistan arose from the ashes of considerable 
civil strife and political turmoil as well as foreign invasion and 
occupation. Reaching back to the era of King Zahir Shah, the 
country struggled to balance establishing a democratic, constitutional 
society with maintaining a monarch state, resulting in intense political 
instability.57 In 1973, former Prime Minster Daoud initiated a 
                                                 
51 See id. at 283-87. 
52 APRP, supra note 4, at 3. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. at 6-7, 10. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 6. 
57 See CHARLES H. BRISCOE ET AL., WEAPON OF CHOICE: U.S. ARMY 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN 8-9 (2003); TANNER, supra note 
49, at 227-29. 
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successful coup and ended King Zahir’s reign.58 Five years in to 
Daoud’s presidency, the instability had grown even more tenuous as 
his attempt institute a new constitution failed and his foreign policy 
deepened resentment from the Communist People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan59 (PDPA).60 In April 1978, following violent 
attacks on the capital city of Kabul that resulted in the murder of 
Daoud and nearly two thousand innocent civilians, Nur Mohammad 
Taraki, the leader of the PDPA, appointed himself to be the 
President of Afghanistan.61 
Taraki wasted no time implementing new Marxist policies and 
received assistance from an influx of Soviet advisors.62 Much to 
Taraki’s dismay, the Afghan people, in particular the rural villagers, 
found his social reform policies to be an abomination of their 
traditional way of life, and they began to revolt.63 During efforts to 
quell these uprisings, government troops under Taraki’s orders killed 
thousands of innocent civilians.64 In September of 1979, President 
Taraki was murdered and replaced by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin.65 
Amin found himself the leader of a country in a full-scale civil war.66 
Because of growing displeasure with Amin’s performance and his 
                                                 
58 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 229. 
59 Nur Mohammed Taraki founded the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) in January of 1965. An ideologically Communist party, the 
PDPA received funding from the KGB and guidance from Moscow. After a short 
time, the PDPA divided into the predominantly Pashtun and significantly more 
radical Khalq faction, led by Taraki, and the intellectual Parcham group, led by 
Babrak Karmal. See TANNER, supra note 49, at 228. 
60 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 229-
31. 
61 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 229-
31. 
62 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9-10; STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: 
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE 
SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, at 42-47 (2005); TANNER, supra note 
49, at 230-32.  
63 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 231-
32. 
64 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 232-33. 
65 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47; 
TANNER, supra note 49, at 233. 
66 See COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47; TANNER, supra note 49, at 233. 
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inability to implement the Soviet agenda, Moscow decided an 
intervention in Afghanistan was imperative.67 
B. The Soviet Occupation 
On Christmas Eve in 1979, Soviet Army troops arrived and 
quickly took control of the Kabul International Airport.68 Three days 
later, they stormed the Darulaman Palace in Kabul and killed 
President Amin allowing Moscow’s replacement choice, Babrak 
Karmal, to assume the presidential role.69 The brutality of the Soviet 
invasion would effectively end the civil uprisings, but not because it 
ended the fighting.70 While the Soviets thought they were coming to 
Afghanistan to provide assistance to the Afghan Army, the invasion 
of the foreign troops invoked a sense of unity in the Afghan people 
that went beyond any tribal affiliation, political party, or ethnic group 
resulting in the mujahedeen.71 While the mujahedeen found unity in the 
common enemy of the Soviet, they lacked structure beyond their 
common purpose.72 By the summer of 1980, only one third of the 
Afghan Army the Soviets sought to reinforce were loyal to the 
Soviets.73 
With Soviet-loyal President Karmal failing to unify a divided 
country brutalized by Soviet occupation, Iran and Pakistan took 
advantage of the mujahedeen and began to covertly introduce support 
to rid the region of Soviet influence.74 In 1986, then Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev expressed immense disapproval of Karmal’s 
failure to heal the “bleeding wound”75 that the military situation in 
                                                 
67 See COLL, supra note 62, at 46-50; TANNER, supra note 49, at 233. 
68 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 10; COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47; 
TANNER, supra note 49, at 233. 
69 See COLL, supra note 62, at 50-52; TANNER, supra note 49, at 235-58. 
70 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 11; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
241. 
71 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 11; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
238-44. 
72 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 248. 
73 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 12. 
74 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 13; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
250-51. 
75 TANNER, supra note 49, at 265. 
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Afghanistan had become, and replaced him as president with 
Mohammed Najibullah in 1987.76 The leadership change was to no 
avail, however, as the mujahedeen’s guerilla tactics and strategic external 
alliances forced the Soviet occupation to end.77 
With the departure of the mujahedeen’s common enemy and 
the country under the control of Communist-backed President 
Najibullah, the struggle for power among tribal leaders and mujahedeen 
commanders soon grew into a full-scale civil war.78 The Najibullah 
government collapsed in 1992 when President Najibullah abandoned 
the government and sought refuge in a U.N. Compound in Kabul.79 
Soon thereafter, the country that had been saved from the Soviets by 
the unified fighters of the mujahedeen was now caught in the crossfire 
of a fierce civil war that would last until 1996.80 
C. Civil War 
The brutality of the civil war became ever more apparent with 
increased reports of the destruction of villages by indiscriminate 
mortar attacks, torturous acts of rape,81 kidnappings, and 
executions.82 Former Junbish commander Rashid Dostum, former 
                                                 
76 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 16; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
265-66.  
77 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 266-70.  
78 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 16-17; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
271. 
79 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
276. 
80 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-21; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
276-80. 
81 While there are reported acts of using rape as a weapon by both the 
Soviets and their affiliated Afghan Army counterparts during the Soviet occupation, 
the majority of the reported instances of using rape as a weapon to punish villages 
and communities for suspected alliances with rival political and mujahedeen groups 
was during the 1992-1996 Civil War. See AFG. JUST. PROJECT, CASTING SHADOWS: 
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 1978-2001, at 62 (2005) 
[hereinafter CASTING SHADOWS], http://afghanistanjusticeproject.org/ 
warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity19782001.pdf. 
82 See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND 
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 21 (2d. ed. 2010) [hereinafter RASHID, 
TALIBAN]; TANNER, supra note 49, at 276-80; CASTING SHADOWS, supra note 81, at 
62. 
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interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and former mujahedeen 
commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf each have been accused of leading 
forces alleged to have committed some of the harshest human rights 
violations on record during the Afghanistan Civil War era.83 In 1993, 
the city of Kabul was pounded by indiscriminate rocket attacks and 
firefights that left 30,000 killed and nearly 100,000 innocent civilians 
wounded.84 Rabbani aligned with Sayyaf and wreaked havoc on the 
Shiites, conducting ruthless beheadings of elderly men as well as 
women and children.85 On the outskirts of the city, Dostum’s fighters 
were using rape as a weapon in the communities and ruthlessly 
executing innocent villagers.86 Shockingly, each of these three 
suspected war criminals would find prominent positions in the 
Karzai-led government following the ouster of the Taliban. 
D. The Rise of the Taliban 
In 1994, the legacy of the Taliban began when two young 
girls were kidnapped and raped by a mujahedeen commander in a 
village outside of Kandahar.87 Mohammed Omar, a young mullah, or 
religious leader, gathered thirty of his religious students, armed them, 
conducted an operation to free the girls, and subsequently hanged the 
mujahedeen kidnapper.88 Hailed a hero by a local populace desperate 
for order in a lawless land, Mullah Omar began to expand his 
religious teachings, and the number of his Taliban fighters and 
followers quickly grew.89 Mullah Omar claimed that the Taliban 
                                                 
83 See COLL, supra note 62, at 263; see also Saeed Shah, Karzai Backs Infa-
mous Warlord to be Speaker, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 29, 2011, 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/karzai-backs-infamous-warlord-to-be-speaker-
20110128-1a8et.html. 
84 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
277.  
85 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
277. 
86 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
277. 
87 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 25. 
88 See CHARLES ALLEN, GOD’S TERRORISTS: THE WAHHABI CULT AND 
THE HIDDEN ROOTS OF MODERN JIHAD 291 (2006); RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 
82, at 41-42. 
89 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 18; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
279. 
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movement was based on the premise that “[the Taliban] were 
fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong. How could [the 
Taliban] remain quiet when [they] could see crimes being committed 
against women and the poor?”90 
After nearly a year of gaining control of provinces around the 
country, the Taliban had to decide whether to attempt to capture 
Kabul, or to retreat to Kandahar and regroup.91 Deciding to regroup 
and reorganize in Kandahar, the Taliban held a shura, or meeting, 
where the local religious leaders named Mullah Omar the Amir ul 
Monimeen, or Commander of the Faithful.92 The next day, Mullah 
Omar appeared wearing the cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, 
essentially granting him the power to lead not just the Taliban but all 
Muslims.93 
In September of 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul94 and 
instituted an intensely strict form of Sharia.95 Under Taliban rule, all 
women were banned from working, all schools for girls were closed, 
and women were required to wear burqas in order to be covered 
completely from head to toe when outside of the home.96 The wolf 
                                                 
90 BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, 
at 25. 
91 See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 
41-42. 
92 See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 
42. 
93 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 42.  
94 See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 292; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 
50-51. 
95 Sharia is the “divinely ordained form of Islamic law” but there are vast 
differences as to the implementation of such law. The Taliban followed and 
vigorously enforced the strictest interpretation of Sharia anywhere in the world. 
The strictest rules of Sharia imposed by the Taliban included a ban on all women’s 
schooling, and forbidding women from working or leaving the home unless in the 
presence of a male family member. Men were required to have a beard. Addition-
ally, all television and music was banned as were games including chess, soccer, and 
the popular game of kite flying. Persons caught stealing would have feet and/or 
hands amputated as punishment. Persons who were caught committing adultery 
would face public stoning. See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; BRISCOE ET AL., supra 
note 57, at 21; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 50-51; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
284. 
96 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 50-51. 
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was out of the sheep’s clothing as the Taliban were no longer the 
saviors of Afghanistan, and were instead quickly imposing a brutal 
reign of the harshest form of Sharia law the world had ever seen.97 
After the successful capture of Kabul, the Taliban continued 
their quest for national dominance by capturing the major cities of 
Bagram and Jalalabad.98 While attempting to take the city of Mazar-e-
Sharif, Dostum’s forces fought back and the Taliban not only 
suffered severe casualties, but were also the victims of brutal war 
crimes99 The Taliban fought back, captured Mazar-e-Sharif,100 and 
moved on to the northern province of Bamyan, murdering innocent 
villagers as their ruthless fighters ravaged the country that lay in their 
path.101 After two years of fighting, the Taliban captured Bamyan in 
2001 and the world gasped as they callously destroyed two sacred and 
archaic Buddha statues.102 The Taliban were now front and center on 
the world stage, but the response to their newfound infamy was a 
separate matter.103 
                                                 
97 See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 292; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 
50-51. 
98 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 21. 
99 Post conflict investigations have unearthed reports of war crimes in-
cluding mass executions of nearly 3,000 Taliban fighters by Malik and Dostum’s 
men and reports of metal shipping containers full of Taliban prisoners of war un-
der the care of Dostum’s men that died of suffocation and/or starvation, depend-
ing on the circumstance. See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 21; RASHID, 
TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 63; TANNER, supra note 49, at 285; CASTING SHADOWS, 
supra note 81, at 62.  
100 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68-75; TANNER, supra note 49, 
at 285. 
101 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68-75; TANNER, supra note 49, 
at 285. 
102 The two Buddha statutes at Bamyan, carved into the cliffs, stood 165 
and 114 feet high before the Taliban destroyed them. Built in the third and fifth 
centuries A.D., they were known around the world as a historic relic to the religious 
traditions of the past. The world community saw the intentional destruction of the 
priceless relics as a final straw, and the Taliban finally had their attention. See 
RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68, 76; 
TANNER, supra note 49, at 285.  
103 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 76; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
285. 
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E. Introducing Al Qaeda 
While world leaders were assessing the rapidly dissolving 
situation in Afghanistan, the Saudi born leader of Al Qaeda, Osama 
bin Laden,104 wasted no time in waging jihad against the West.105 In 
August of 1998, Al Qaeda operatives bombed U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.106 Two years later in October of 2000, Al Qaeda 
operatives bombed the U.S.S. Cole while at port off the coast of 
Yemen, killing seventeen U.S. Navy sailors.107 
The failure of the world to recognize the Taliban as the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan, and further sanction the group 
for the human rights violations and atrocities being committed in 
Afghanistan, created an ideal situation for Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.108 The Taliban needed both financial and logistical support 
from outside of the country, likely from Arab backers; Al Qaeda 
could provide this support if the Taliban would provide them a safe 
harbor to train as the U.S. hunted them in response to the attacks on 
U.S. embassies and the U.S.S. Cole.109 An accord was struck and a 
mutually beneficial relationship began that continues today.110 
With only the powerful warlord Massoud still standing in the 
Taliban’s way of near complete control of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda 
offered to assist the Taliban by sending two operatives posing as 
                                                 
104 Osama bin Laden was killed on Sunday, May 1, 2011, during a coordi-
nated raid by U.S. Navy SEALS and CIA operatives in a compound in Pakistan. 
Peter Baker, Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed. 
html?pagewanted=all.  
105 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 76; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
285. 
106 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 134; TANNER, supra note 49, at 
286. 
107 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87. 
108 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note 
49, at 286-87. 
109 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra 
note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87. 
110 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 19; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra 
note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87. 
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journalists to kill him.111 The mission succeeded, and Massoud died 
on September 9, 2001.112 Massoud’s death allowed the Taliban to 
further their dominance in the region, but it also increased their 
reliance on Al Qaeda.113 Just two days later on September 11, 2001, 
Al Qaeda operatives would crash four planes into targets in the 
United States, resulting in the loss of nearly 3,000 innocent lives, and 
marking the beginning of what would become known as the Global 
War on Terror.114 
F. Post 9/11 Afghanistan 
The attacks on America on September 11, 2001 ushered in 
yet another era of fighting for the war torn people of Afghanistan as 
the United States-led Coalition Forces retaliated against Al Qaeda and 
their Taliban hosts.115 In early October of 2001, U.S. Army Special 
Operations Forces conducted various missions to secure airfields and 
compounds, and directed air strikes in Afghanistan.116 After months 
of intense fighting, bombing campaigns, and the arrival of 
conventional forces, the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were forced 
to retreat, and the momentum belonged to the Coalition Forces.117 
During this operational pause, the people of Afghanistan 
took the opportunity to adopt an interim government, appointing 
Hamid Karzai118 to serve as the interim President.119 This also marked 
                                                 
111 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 19; RASHID, DESCENT, supra 
note 47, at 19; TANNER, supra note 49, at 287.  
112 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 19; RASHID, DESCENT, supra 
note 47, at 19; TANNER, supra note 49, at 287.  
113 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 19. 
114 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 
311-13 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf; TANNER, supra note 
49, at 289-91. 
115 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 295-97. 
116 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 96-113; TANNER, supra note 49 at 
295-300.  
117 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 304. 
118 Hamid Karzai was appointed the interim President of Afghanistan at 
the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn, Germany, in December 
2001, where Afghan and international leaders decided on the temporary govern-
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the first time in nearly six years that the Afghan people could begin 
rebuilding their country free from Taliban oppression.120 However, 
some expressed concern that merely pushing the Taliban back 
without defeating them left the door open for a resurgence of 
violence.121 This premonition would prove true as Taliban and 
Coalition Forces continue their back and forth struggle for control 
even today. 
III. PRELUDE TO MODERN RECONCILIATION 
Throughout the course of the current war in Afghanistan, 
several programs have been enacted to afford insurgent fighters the 
opportunity to reconcile with the government.122 These programs 
have met with mixed results, but a common theme is that none has 
resulted in long-term implementation or sustained success.123 
One of the first examples of a failed reconciliation program 
in the post-9/11 conflict was the Afghanistan New Beginnings 
Program (“ANBP”).124 The ANBP provided the Afghan government 
assistance in implementing a Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (“DDR”) program for militant forces that wished to 
turn in their weapons and join the new Afghan National Army or 
                                                 
ment and leadership. See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 95-96. In October of 
2004, Karzai was elected President of Afghanistan in the country’s first democratic 
election since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. Karzai Declared Afghan President, 
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3977677.stm (last updated Nov. 3, 
2004, 12:45 GMT). In 2009, he was elected to his second term as President of Af-
ghanistan in a second democratic election. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai Declared 
Elected President of Afghanistan, CNN.COM, Nov. 2, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com 
/2009-11-02/world/afghanistan.election.runoff_1_azizullah-lodin-abdullah-
abdullah-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:WORLD. 
119 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 96-97; TANNER, supra note 
49, at 307-08. 
120 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 96-97; TANNER, supra note 
49, at 307-08. 
121 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 304. 
122 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 51-66. 
123 See id.  
124 See Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, UNDP, http://www.anbp. 
af.undp.org/homepage/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  
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Afghan National Police.125 Applying the policies set forth in the 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (“DIAG”), the ANBP 
mandated that members of illegal armed factions turn in their 
weapons and provide the government of Afghanistan with lists of 
individuals serving in these anti-military forces.126 While the DDR 
appears to have had success in the collection of weapons, the ANBP 
as a whole did not have a structure in place to provide sustained 
socio-economic support to those individuals renouncing their 
previous affiliation with illegal armed factions.127 As result, the 
ANBP’s success was minimal.128 
Another reconciliation program that has met with limited 
success is the Program Takhim-e-Sohl (“PTS”), or Strengthening 
Through Peace Program.129 Introduced in 2005, the goal of PTS was 
to provide a means for former combatants to reconcile with the 
government in return for their safety from future military action by 
Afghan and Coalition Forces.130 By 2007, reports claimed that more 
than 4,000 former combatants had participated in PTS, but 
inconsistencies and questionable reporting mar the integrity of these 
reports.131 The PTS program failed to sustain long-term success in 
part because of the lack of clear guidance for, and efficient 
management by, the local offices responsible for the program’s 
                                                 
125 See Ali Ahmed, Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme Client Satisfaction 
Survey: Comparative Analysis, UNDP, July 31, 2005, http://erc.undp.org/ 
evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1064; Afghanistan’s New Begin-
nings Programme, supra note 124. 
126 See Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, supra note 124. 
127 See ROBIN-EDWARD POULTON, DIAG EVALUATION: DISBANDMENT 
OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN, A PROJECT OF THE UNITED 
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execution.132 Additionally, a lack of senior level insurgent commander 
participation in the program, a failure to combine the program with a 
demobilization process, and a lack of international support also 
contributed to the program’s failure.133 Further, combatants had little 
trust that the program would fulfill the promises it made due to 
allegations of corruption. In particular, the safety of the reconciled 
fighters could not be guaranteed.134 
IV. THE AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 
Faced with a deteriorating security situation, the decreasing 
political will on the part of the Coalition forces to wage long-term 
war, and a populace yearning for a stable and peaceful country, the 
Afghan government’s most recent attempt at reconciliation includes a 
revision of previous strategies.135 The APRP is based on the 
recommendations of Afghan delegates of the Consultative Peace 
Jirga, presented at the London Conference in June of 2010, and 
formalized in July of the same year.136 The APRP is based on three 
pillars: (1) strengthening security and promoting peace and 
reintegration through civilian governance; (2) improving the political 
process to provide a longstanding peace for the populace; and (3) 
providing local, regional, and international support in establishing 
peace and stability.137 The peace and reintegration process of the first 
pillar is divided into two categories: operational and strategic/political 
levels.138 The operational level addresses how to engage low-level 
fighters locally in their villages and districts.139 More sensitive issues 
arise with respect to the reintegration of senior-level insurgent 
commanders, the strategic/political level of the operation.140 
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A. Phase One: Social Outreach and Grievance Resolution 
Regardless of the category the individual falls in, the three-
phase peace and reintegration process remains the same.141 The first 
phase includes social outreach programs, negotiations, and grievance 
resolution.142 This step is vital because the community plays an 
integral role in accepting and reintegrating the reconciled combatant 
into the community.143 Perhaps one of the most important aspects of 
this stage is the grievance resolution process available to combatants 
and their victims.144 
The APRP, however, only allows for resolution of those 
grievances that are “creating armed resistance and violence and those 
linked to dissatisfaction with governance.”145 This language of the 
APRP creates concern for human rights groups because, while 
current grievances are addressed, the program fails to offer a means 
for victims of prior crimes to seek redress.146 During the negotiation 
and grievance resolution process, if an irreconcilable conflict arises 
and neither the local leaders, third party mediators, nor the 
government can help resolve the grievance, relocation of the 
reconciled former fighter may be available within or outside of 
Afghanistan.147 It is also recognized that this crucial first step may 
take a substantial amount of time and, as such, may be completed 
simultaneous to phase two of the peace and reintegration process.148 
B. Phase Two: Demobilization 
The second phase occurs when a fighter renounces violence, 
accepts the laws and the Constitution of Afghanistan, agrees to live 
by those laws, and demobilizes.149 Once this occurs, the individual 
becomes eligible for amnesty as described in the existing 
                                                 
141 See id. at 5-6.  
142 See id. at 5-10. 
143 See id. 
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147 See id. at 5-10. 
148 See id. at 10. 
149 See id. at 6-7, 10. 
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:2 
412 
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.150 This law allows for political 
amnesty for anti-government fighters dating back as far as the 
beginning of the Soviet invasion in 1979.151 Once deemed eligible for 
amnesty under the APRP, ex-combatants register their weapons and 
their biometric data is collected.152 If the individual is a detainee, he is 
released to a community that agrees to support his social 
reintegration process.153 
C. Phase Three: Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery 
The final phase of the APRP is the consolidation of peace 
and community recovery.154 This phase provides a menu of options 
that, while not available in its entirety to all communities due to 
diverse socio-economic needs and varying security requirements, 
have one goal: to provide a basic structure to get the fighter and the 
community started on a path to successful reintegration and sustained 
peace.155 Consolidation of peace and community recovery is achieved 
through educational and occupational opportunities that benefit not 
only the newly reconciled former fighter, but also the community that 
chooses to embrace him.156 
D. APRP: Noble Aspirations, Poor Execution 
In theory, the APRP seeks to achieve a sustainable peace for 
Afghanistan by utilizing community and international support to 
entice fighters to leave their anti-government networks and align 
themselves with the legitimate government of Afghanistan.157 In 
reality, there are aspects of the APRP that provide hurdles to achieve 
this noble and very necessary goal. Born from corruption, the 
legislature created the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law not to 
support the Justice Action Plan, but instead to protect its own 
members, as many of them feared prosecution for their past 
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crimes.158 As a result, the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law failed to 
provide an end date for granting amnesty to fighters actively engaged 
in conflict against the government of Afghanistan. Once combined 
with the implementing guidance of APRP, the Reconciliation and 
Amnesty Law continues to grant amnesty to broad classes of anti-
government fighters but fails to provide a means for victims of 
crimes committed during the last three decades of armed conflict to 
seek justice. 
V. THE APRP AND THE RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY LAW: 
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS 
A. Legislation Born From Corruption 
As discussed above, the Justice Action Plan provided a 
comprehensive approach to transitional justice in Afghanistan.159 One 
of the plan’s key provisions created a truth commission that would 
investigate past abuses and injustices and advise the legislature on 
how to address such abuses in the future.160 Unfortunately, the 
legislature’s members, including people like notorious war criminal 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,161 thereafter drafted the Reconciliation and 
Amnesty Law, which protects criminals and does next to nothing to 
assist victims seeking truth or justice. 
                                                 
158 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 59-60. 
159 See JUSTICE ACTION PLAN, supra note 33. 
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161 Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is notorious for his ruthless crimes against the 
Hazaras during the civil war. Sayyaf, leader of the Wahhabi Ittihad-i-Islami group, 
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B. Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, Standing Alone 
The Reconciliation and Amnesty Law places a heavy burden 
on the victims of war crimes and human rights abuses. The law’s first 
section allows for the reconciliation of any anti-government faction, 
political party, or hostile party who fought against the government 
prior to the establishment of the Interim Administration.162 Section 
one also affords these individuals general amnesty so that they “shall 
not be legally or judicially prosecuted.”163 The law’s second section 
goes on to state that those who are currently engaged in armed 
conflict with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, but choose to 
cease and reconcile, shall enjoy the benefits of amnesty and 
reconciliation should they accept the constitution and choose to 
abide by the laws.164 The first section permits amnesty for anyone 
who committed a crime against the Afghan government from as early 
as the Soviet invasion of 1979. Because of the open date in the law’s 
second section, those who continue to commit hostile acts might be 
granted amnesty in the future as well.165 
This open-ended construction arguably allows more 
combatants to reconcile with the government because the country 
remains actively engaged in armed conflict. The purpose of the law is, 
after all, to encourage fighters to cease fighting in opposition to the 
government and become part of a unified and peaceful 
Afghanistan.166 However, the law also provides a convenient escape 
when these fighters are known targets of Afghan and Coalition 
Forces. One of the benefits of reconciling with the government is not 
only amnesty from prosecution of previous hostile acts against the 
government, but also removal from targeting lists or “black-lists.”167 
The removal of reconciled fighters from these lists is an important 
step in gaining the trust of the ex-combatants as they reintegrate into 
the community. However, when abused, this step provides a 
convenient operational pause for fighters who seek refuge under the 
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guise that they are participating in a legitimate program when they 
have no intent to fully reconcile. Revision of the Reconciliation and 
Amnesty Law by adding an end date for available reconciled fighters 
to participate in the program could alleviate that problem. 
C. Implementing the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law with the 
APRP: Forgetting Twenty Years of Victims 
As mentioned above in the discussion of the historical 
underpinnings leading to the current political situation in 
Afghanistan, many human rights violations from the previous three 
decades remain unanswered. Some of the alleged human rights 
violations most relevant to this discussion include the alleged 
beheadings and rapes committed by Barhnuddin Rabbani’s men 
during the Afghan Civil War in 1993.168 Rabbani then served as the 
interim President of Afghanistan.169 Rabbani, who was never charged 
or convicted of his alleged war crimes, recently served as the chair of 
the High Peace Council, the organization responsible for overseeing 
the implementation of the APRP.170 In September 2011, a suicide 
bomber gained access to Rabbani’s compound, killing Rabbani and 
four other members of the High Peace Council.171 The immediate 
question that arises from Rabbani’s recent position and very critical 
responsibilities stems directly from the scars of the civil war that have 
not been overshadowed by modern conflict. Was it possible for 
Rabbani, an alleged perpetrator of war crimes, to effectively 
implement and oversee a reconciliation and reintegration program 
that includes not only amnesty for war criminals, but also a grievance 
resolution process for victims of such atrocities? With his death, 
perhaps there is no answer to that question. However, the process 
that put an alleged violator of human rights in charge of overseeing 
the peace process in a war-ravaged country should be carefully 
scrutinized. 
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Perhaps the intent of the APRP is simply to forgive all alleged 
war criminals and forget their crimes so that the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan can move forward and free itself from the previous three 
decades of brutality. Can this amnesty approach work in a country 
that has been ravaged by war for thirty years and has so many war 
crimes yet to be addressed? 
The reality of the APRP might be very clearly reflected in the 
text of the plan itself. The program focuses on “those grievances that 
are creating armed resistance and violence and those linked to 
dissatisfaction with governance. It cannot tackle all long-term 
grievances in Afghanistan.”172 The plain language of the document, 
which became effective in July of 2010, indicates that the grievance 
resolution process is available to those seeking redress for current 
grievances, and specifically declares that those victims of the past will 
not be considered because the government simply “cannot tackle” 
their concerns. Moreover, the APRP fails to utilize the resources 
available to resolve grievances from previous conflicts.173 While 
perhaps understandable given the fact that the country is currently 
engaged in armed conflict and peace is the immediate goal, the 
explicit exclusion of previous perpetrators and victims of war crimes 
raises several concerns. How will victims of war crimes that occurred 
prior to the modern Global War on Terror era seek justice? Who is 
eligible to seek justice for those victims who are gone but whose 
perpetrators remain and whose crimes remain unaccounted for? 
There is no avenue for survivors of slain victims to heal the wounds 
of war and the unnecessary loss of those that they love. 
Another concern of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law 
stems from its over-inclusiveness, as it permits amnesty for the 
perpetrators of crimes dating back more than thirty years.174 The 
APRP implements the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law by providing 
for the reintegration of current fighters who wish to reconcile with 
the Afghan government according to the terms of the APRP, and 
authorizes amnesty from prosecution for those deemed eligible. 
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Because the APRP only addresses current and recent fighters, but 
existing legislation permits reconciliation and amnesty for a broader 
population of perpetrators, the question remains as to how to 
respond to those from previous conflicts who wish to avail 
themselves of the reconciliation process. There is no incentive for ex-
fighters to maintain a life of peace when they are excluded from the 
support the APRP can provide. If anything, the APRP may entice 
them to take up arms again so that they may become eligible for the 
programs offered by the APRP. Further, what framework is in place 
to ensure that the reconciled combatants from previous conflicts 
maintain their commitment to the government of Afghanistan, and 
what support is available to assist them in this endeavor? 
Perhaps the more significant failure of the Reconciliation and 
Amnesty Law relates to the victims of the crimes. One example of 
this failure is Rashid Dostum, whose victims included not only 
innocent villagers but also members of the Taliban. Dostum is 
alleged to have taken hundreds of Taliban prisoners captive and 
transported them in large metal shipping containers over many 
miles.175 Few of those prisoners survived, and Dostum has never 
been prosecuted for these alleged crimes.176 In fact, Dostum recently 
served in the Karzai administration as both the Afghan Army Chief 
of Staff and Deputy Defense Minister.177 While victims are 
traditionally thought to be people like Aisha and young Shafiq, 
history reveals that there are Taliban victims as well. 
It defies logic that the Afghan government would ask 
members of the Taliban to reconcile when they hypocritically employ 
one of the most notorious offenders of human rights. Further, the 
government not only allows such perpetrators to be safe from 
prosecution for their crimes, but also fails to provide a grievance 
resolution process for the victims or their families. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the challenges facing the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan are daunting. The last thirty years have taken 
an immense toll on the Afghan people, creating generations who 
know only war and have yet to experience peace. Government efforts 
to move the county forward have focused only on reconciling with 
former combatants, while leaving thousands of victims of violence 
and their families without the opportunity to seek justice.178 
The APRP has done a fair job assessing the needs of 
combatants using a multi-phased, community based approach to 
provide a sustainable reintegration program.179 It is, of course, not 
without faults: the victims of the modern conflict have an 
opportunity to be heard while many of the victims from earlier 
decades are left seeking justice. Rather than ignoring these victims, 
the government needs to provide a mechanism to resolve their 
grievances. During a time when building trust is crucial to the success 
of the nation’s future, a critical step in the healing process is 
implementing a program that achieves a sense of justice for all 
victims before eliminating the threat of prosecution for their 
perpetrators. 
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